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Abstract Fallowing with green fertilizer can benefit
agricultural ecosystem services (AES). Farmers in Taiwan
do not implement fallow practices and plant green fertilizer
because the current subsidy level (46,000 NT$ per ha) is
too low to manage fallowing. This paper defines the
objective of government agriculture policy or the farmer’s
objective as maximization of farm productivity, approxi-
mated to the value of social welfare and AES. Farms,
which do not follow proper fallowing practices, often have
poorly maintained fallow land or left farmland abandoned.
This results in negative environmental consequences such
as cutworm infestations in abandoned land, which in turn
can affect crops in adjacent farmlands. The objectives of
this study are twofold. First, it determines the proper fal-
lowing subsidy based on the concept of payment for eco-
system services to entice more farmers to participate in
fallowing. Second, it simulates the benefit of planting green
manure in fallow land to the supply of AES based on the
rate of farmers who are willing to participate in fallow land
practices and essential parameters that can affect soil fer-
tility change. The approach involves a series of interviews
and a developed empirical model. The value of AES when
the rate of farmer participation is 100% represents a 1.5%
increase in AES (448,317,000 NT$) over the value at the
current participation rate of 14%. This study further con-
cludes that the appropriate fallowing subsidy has a large
positive impact on AES and social welfare (e.g., benefit
from food and biofuel supplies) and is seen as a basis of
ecological governance for sustainable agro-ecosystems.
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ecological services  Fallow  Soil fertility  Taiwan 
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Introduction
In this paper, agricultural ecosystem services (AES) are
defined as benefits people derive from agricultural ecosys-
tems, including food and resources, regulation of climate and
disease, support through processes such as crop pollination,
and cultural services such as recreation (Daily 1997; Mil-
lennium Ecosystem Assessment 2003). To promote fallow
land management and the supply of AES, payment for eco-
system services (PES) has been used as an incentive in recent
years (Antle et al. 2007). However, for PES to be successful,
an appropriate level of incentive is needed (Tilman 2002).
Also needed is a new priority in government policy because
incentives often favor increased agricultural production at
the expense of ecosystem services.
Nevertheless, several negative consequences can also
result from unsuitable fallowing practices. Farms that are left
fallow but poorly maintained or that are planted with green
fertilizer but allowed to become overgrown with weeds can
negatively impact surrounding farms. As an example, such
farms can become havens for pests such as rats or cotton
worms, which infest neighboring properties, reducing
overall farm productivity. Further, very poorly maintained
farmland functions much the same as abandoned farmland,
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producing negative externalities such as runoff and soil
degradation in down-slope areas (Harden 2001).
In Taiwan, farm subsidies in the past have favored the
planting of green fertilizer in fallow fields to improve soil
fertility. However, over the past 5 years, the Taiwanese
government has also encouraged farmers to use fallow
fields for the planting of energy crops (e.g., soybeans and
sugarcane) and food crops (e.g., rice), as food and energy
security have become agricultural policy priorities. A
practice essential for sustainable agricultural ecosystems is
fallow land management because fallow periods tradition-
ally serve to restore and improve soil fertility for next
cultivation period (Heerink 2005). Therefore, it is impor-
tant to re-examine fallowing and its benefits.
This paper focuses on government policy that encourages
farmers to manage fallow fields through farm subsidies. One
issue is the subsidy gap. This occurs when subsidies do not
meet the cost to farmers of leaving productive land fallow.
This kind of policy can result in land abandonment. Another
issue is an inappropriate pricing of fallow lands’ contribution
to soil productivity and the resulting improved supply of
ecological services. Thus, the objectives of this paper are (1)
to examine how subsidies can be determined based on PES to
entice more farmers to participate in fallowing and (2) to
propose effective ways of improving the supply of AES. It is
believed that appropriate government subsidy cannot only




Society receives many ecosystem service benefits from
natural and managed ecosystems (Daily 1997). Ecosystems
provide food, fiber, fuel, and materials for shelter; addi-
tionally, they provide a range of benefits that are difficult to
quantify and that have rarely been priced (National Research
Council 2000; Daily 2000). One exception is Antle and
Stoorvogel (2006), which used empirical models to quantify
non-marketable ecosystem service from agriculture.
Throughout the world, the focus of agricultural policy is
shifting away from traditional subsidy and trade policies
toward conservation and the environmental aspects of
agriculture. This change in perspective has caused agri-
culture to be viewed as a managed ecosystem, and the
ecosystem services provided by agriculture are known to
depend on agricultural land and associated management
practices. Agricultural ecosystems rely on a suite of sup-
porting ecosystem services to provide food, fiber, and fuel
as well as a range of accompanying but non-marketable
ecosystem services. Ecosystem services from agriculture
include the regulation of water and climate systems, aes-
thetic and cultural services, and enhanced supporting ser-
vices such as soil fertility (Swinton 2007).
Soil fertility, fallowing, and abandoned land
Fertile soil with good physical properties to support root
growth is essential for sustainable agriculture. Soil infertility is
frequently cited as a constraint to crop production in the tro-
pics (Jordan 1985; Sanchez and Logan 1992; Warner 1991).
Organic matter is an indicator of soil fertility. On average,
organic matter makes up less than 2% of paddy land in sub-
tropical areas (Gu 2006), and its seasonal rate of consumption
is within the range of 1.5–3.2% if green manure is not
implemented (Sheng 2005). On the other hand, planting green
fertilizer, such as Indian Sesbania, can improve the percentage
of organic matter in paddy land (Nambiar and Abrol 1989).
In a comparative study of land fertility in Taiwan for the
period from 1995 to 2000, Lo (2009) proposed that fallow land
when planted with green fertilizer can have more organic
matter by an average of 0.5–1.5% than organic matter in
abandoned land. Lo (2009) also found that the average rice
yield after fallowing was 4,506 t/ha, representing a 2%
increase (88 t/ha) over the yield of non-fallow land
(4,418 t/ha). Every year, pest damage due to abandoned land
causes an average loss of up to 15% in production during the
first growing season and 30% during the second. French
(1978) suggested that mean grain yield after fallowing was
1,515 kg/ha, representing a 31% increase (355 kg/ha) over
the non-fallow yield of 1,160 kg/ha. The effects of land deg-
radation on productivity can sometimes be compensated for
by increased fertilization, irrigation, and disease control,
which in turn increase production costs. Moreover, the
increased use of fertilizers can contribute to environmental
problems such as the eutrophication of aquatic habitats
(Cassman 1999).
It is evident from the above discussion that fallow
periods play an integral role both in improving soil pro-
ductivity and in increasing ecosystem services. It is also
evident that soil productivity can be improved by the
planting of green manure and legumes during fallow
periods. A further benefit from fallow periods is the con-
servation of biodiversity (Fu 1995). In light of these facts,
agricultural policy needs to be directed so as to maximize
both the social value of appropriate land use and the output
of conventional agricultural products in order to reap all the
benefits AES can provide (Antle et al. 2007).
The importance of information collection
in understanding farmers
Farmers are key stakeholders in agricultural issues. This
means that understanding their behavior and attitudes is an
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essential priority in designing appropriate agricultural
policy. One means of acquiring information on farmer
motivations is the interview process. Beedell (2000) used
an interview process based on a social-psychological
model, the Theory of Planned Behavior, to collect infor-
mation regarding farmers’ conservation-related behavior in
Britain. Potter and Lobley (1996) conducted interviews
with farmers throughout Britain in 1993 to identify high-
and low-landscape-change farms, in terms of environ-
mental stock, and to examine the relationship between farm
business development and environmental change. In a
study on the implementation of a PES scheme, in case of
farming practices that were resulting in an increased
nitrates in the aquifer of Vittel, Perrot-Maıˆtre (2006) pro-
posed the following four-step approach to understanding
the historical influences, geography, and social factors that
influence farming practices:
1. Understand the relevant farming systems and why
farmers do what they do.
2. Analyze the conditions under which farmers would
consider changing farming practices.
3. Identify, test, and validate in farmers’ fields the
management practices necessary to reduce the nitrate
threat.
4. Provide financial and technical support to farmers who
are willing to enter the program.
Farmer participation and incentive mechanisms
Farmer participation in more environmentally friendly
farming methods can be encouraged through agricultural
policy by regulating farming to incorporate certain prac-
tices. However, ensuring the success of a regulatory
approach is not a simple undertaking given that many
environmental problems and ecosystem services are diffi-
cult to monitor and quantify (Tilman 2002). PES is an
alternative to an adversarial regulatory approach in
resource management. PES provides positive incentives for
farmers to preserve environmental resources. While a PES
system also requires monitoring and verification of com-
pliance with contracts to provide ecosystem services, it
allows for a more positive relationship between farmers
and the government (Nalukenge 2006). Several policy
initiatives have attempted to balance the needs for agri-
cultural production and for ecosystem services. Jack (2008)
emphasized that because PES programs are incentive
based, policymakers can draw on farmers’ substantial body
of knowledge. Further, PES schemes offer a direct method
for achieving environmental outcomes that is possibly
more equitable than other approaches. Antle and Stoorvo-
gel (2008) also suggested that governments use tax reve-
nues to pay landowners to manage lands in ways that can
protect or enhance the provision of ecosystem services.
This paper makes a similar proposal for using tax revenues
to subsidize farmers’ management of their fallow land. The
success of environmental projects requires that policy-
makers take into account the factors that determine farm-
ers’ land management decisions. If policymakers do not
consider these factors, such programs tend to fail after the
intensive technical assistance, special incentives, and sub-
sidies provided by the government are no longer available,
as was noted by Barbier (1997).
Linear programming
A number of empirical models and approaches have been
designed to assess optimal farm production based on
farmer decisions. Linear programming models try to satisfy
a set of goals that are compatible with preferences revealed
by farmers (Sumpsi 1996). Massell and Johnson (1968)
emphasized the necessity of profit maximization in
resource use on the average farm. Huang et al. (2005)
discussed the farmers’ optimal decision model using a
linear programming function with a focus on production
costs. Sumpsi (1996) also proposed a multicriteria
approach within a linear programming framework to ana-
lyze and predict farmer behavior in farm planning and
agricultural management.
However, almost all maximization studies of farmers’
decisions have focused on economic factors such as pro-
duction costs, labor input, and land rent rather than on
ecosystem services, such as soil fertility. These economic
factors might not adequately represent all the externalities
that profit-maximizing behavior produces. The cost of
those could be borne in reduced AES. Appropriate gov-
ernment policy needs to reflect the true value of ecosystem
services and the true costs of particular farming practices.
In this paper, the objective of government agricultural
policy is defined as the maximization of farm productivity,
which is an approximation of the value of social welfare
and AES. One area in which this can be achieved is in
improving soil fertility by adhering to appropriate fallow
practices. Tilman (2002) stated that the goal of sustainable
agriculture is to maximize the net benefits to society from
the agricultural production of food, fiber, and ecosystem
services. Farmer participation is a central issue in achiev-
ing sustainable agriculture. Thus, a sustainable agricultural
management model should be based on farmer participa-
tion with a view toward maximizing ecosystem services.
In the literature review, we saw that soil fertility directly
contributes to higher yields and, in turn, to improved
human well-being. Therefore, soil fertility can be viewed
as representative of a specific aspect of AES; that is, it
results in an increased yields, improved human welfare
(including farmers’ income), and increased ecosystem
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services. This study focuses on three land types: fallow
land that is planted with green manure, fallow land that is
left abandoned, and land that is cultivated intensively.
Materials and methods
Data
This study assumed that the total farmland area was
19,637 ha (see Fig. 1), corresponding to the area where
interviews of farmers were conducted (see ‘‘Interviews of
farmers’’). The total area was needed as a parameter for a
constraint function in the AES model. Other input data to
the model included net income per hectare from planting of
rice (for food), soybean (for energy crop), and rape flower
(for green fertilizer; Table 1) and soil fertility parameters
with either positive or negative values (Table 2).
Method
First, we interviewed farmers to obtain information
regarding their attitude toward the PES scheme and
requirements that are necessary from a policy perspective
to improve farmer compliance with fallow land practices.
Second, we used the linear programming approach to
develop an AES model centered on soil fertility (Fig. 2).
Within this model, farmer participation in fallow land
practice is based on either incomplete or complete infor-
mation on subsidy. The inputs to the model are factors that
can either improve or reduce soil fertility depending on
farm management practices, and the output is revenue
indicative of the value of AES. Land A in Fig. 2 includes
two scenarios: fallow land planted with green fertilizer has
positive impacts on soil fertility (?) and abandoned fallow
land has negative impacts on soil fertility (-). Lands B and
C are intensely cultivated with rice and energy crop,
respectively, both impacting soil fertility negatively (-).
Interviews of farmers
To better understand why farmers abandon fallow fields,
this study used a series of interviews to obtain information
on how to motivate farmers to participate in fallowing
through a PES incentive mechanism. Specifically, this
study adopted steps 1 and 2 of the four-step approach
proposed by Perrot-Maıˆtre (2006) to find out the level of
subsidy that can be accepted by farmers to participate in
fallowing. Interviews were conducted in 2009 in Chiayi
County, the main agricultural county in Taiwan. According
Fig. 1 Study area
Table 1 Net income of plantings and crops
Farmland Type of planting Net income Reference
Planted for food Rice 55,000 Cheng (2006); Council of Agriculture (COA) (2008)
Planted for energy Sugarcane 74,300
Fallow Rape flower as green fertility plant 38,000
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to the Chiayi local governmental report (2008), 40% of
households in the county were classified as farming, the
average farmer’s age was 61, abandoned fields accounted
for 17% of the county’s farmland, and 24% of farmer’s
income was from farming revenue.
Using a simple random sample of 525 people, the phone
interviews involved 116 farmers from the Chiayi Farmers’
Association. Eighty-five percent of these farmers were
60–64 in age and the remainder 55–59. They were asked
the following three questions:
1. Is a subsidy key to determining whether you leave land
fallow or not?
2. If the subsidy was above the current level, would you
then comply with fallow land policy?
3. How much subsidy would you require?
Empirical model to measure the benefit of AES
Linear programming was used in this study to solve the
AES model so that it would achieve the maximum profit
for the farmer and the government. Our assumption is
that the government has the same objective as the farmer,
that is, to maximize the human social welfare and AES.
To combine ecological perspectives with the profit-max-
imization objective of government policy, the AES model
we constructed has an infinite cultivation period con-
strained by decreased soil fertility due to abandonment
and cropping. The objective function uses a logarithm for
linear programming since it is a general solution to the
dynamic parameter in a time series. Because the AES
model focuses on government policy objectives and
ecological perspectives, the present value of the time
series of cash flows and opportunity cost can be ignored.
With input data from Table 1, the model combining the





bt1 PRAR;t þ PBAB;t þ PFAF;t
 
s:t:A0 AR;t þ AB;t þ AF;t; 8t
1  h  að ÞA0t ¼ At; 8t
Qt þ rAF;t  dRAR;t  dBAB;t ¼ Qtþ1; 8t
AR;t; AB;t; AF;t; At  0; 8t
In the objective function, the maximized production R
denotes the value of ecosystem services, optimized by
profit from agricultural total production. P denotes the
Table 2 Parameters affect soil fertility in the AES model
Parameter a h d r
Effect on soil fertility Negative (-) Negative (-) Negative (-) Positive (?)
Data available A series of interviews Huang (2009) Sheng (2005) Lo (2009)
Data range PES and adoption 0.15–0.30 t/ha 0.15–0.32 kg/ha 0.02 t/ha
a denotes the percentage of farmers abandoning land, h is a parameter denoting a decrease in soil fertility as a result of abandonment, d denotes
the decline in soil fertility after harvesting crops, and r denotes restoration of soil fertility by fallow practices that contribute to productivity
during the ongoing growing season
Fig. 2 A schematic of AES model design
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profit per hectare, and A denotes cultivating area. PR ln AR;t
denotes the profit of planting rice, PBAB;t for the profit of
planting energy crops (e.g., soybeans), and PF ln AF;t for
the profit of planting green fertilizers (e.g., Brassica napus
L.). b is the discount factor of the infinite series. Two
constrained functions can be implied by fluctuation in
ecosystem services. In the first and second constrained
functions, area for every t period has to be no more than
19,637 ha.
In the second constrained function, the harvest area of
farmland varies with the restoration and degradation of soil
fertility due to fallowing and abandonment, respectively
(Fig. 3). For example, yield diminishes when soil fertility
is degraded after farmers decide to abandon land. A0 rep-
resents the reduced harvest area from At because of h  a,
where a denotes the percentage of farmers abandoning land
and h is a parameter denoting a decrease in soil fertility as a
result of abandonment (Roder 1994; Jordan 1985; Sanchez
and Logan 1992; Warner 1991). From an ecological
viewpoint, h  a is the main factor that causes productivity
declines and lessened soil fertility. Here, 0 h  a\1. That
is, At, or total farmland area for period t, varies negatively
with h  a: when h  a is greater, At is lower.
In the third constraint function, Qt denotes the produc-
tion by the improvement of soil fertility. Qt?1 is the pro-
duction of period t ? 1 and its production variation
affected by parameters soil fertility. r denotes restoration
of soil fertility by fallow practices that contribute to pro-
ductivity during the ongoing growing season (Wu 2002;
Cassman 1999); in contrast, d denotes the decline in soil
fertility after harvesting crops (dR denotes the decline after
the rice harvest, and dB denotes the decline after the harvest
of energy crops). In other words, in the third constrained
function conducts the area of period summed by the area of
period t - 1 and its soil fertility variation affected by
parameters soil fertility.
The assumptions with regard to which parameters have a
positive or negative effect on soil fertility are presented in
Table 1. Table 1 illustrates parameters used to formulate
AES. These parameters have a positive or negative effect
on soil fertility. a represents percentage of farmers aban-
doning land; if a is small, it means a positive effect on soil
fertility because through fallow land practices farmers are
restoring soil fertility and contributing positively to pro-
ductivity during the growing season (Gu 2006; Lo 2009). h
and d illustrate the negative effects on soil fertility. h
represents a loss to production on average due to pest
damage (Huang 2010), and d represents decline in soil
fertility after regular cropping (Sheng 2005).
Genetic Algorithm (GA) is one of a family of heuristic
optimization techniques, which include simulated anneal-






































































Fig. 3 The relationship of soil
fertility and harvest area
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adopted GA because the technique has been demonstrated
to converge to the optimal solution for many diverse
applications (Coit 1996). The value of AES can be affected
by a variety of factors, of which the rate of farmer par-
ticipation in fallow, amount of subsidy, and soil fertility are
the factors considered in this study.
Results and discussions
Interview results
Some farmers said that serious cutworm damage occurred
when planting green fertilizer on fallow land, requiring a lot
of money for pest control. To them, the cost of fallow man-
agement was not affordable in the long term. Others stated
that farm income had been declining with decreased pro-
ductivity, most young people were not willing to work in
agriculture, and they were too old to pursue pest control
during fallow periods. In addition, for those farmers who
were complying with fallow regulations at the time of inter-
view, the subsidy was not really enough to support the fallow.
In terms of the sampling statistics or the subsidy
requirement for maintaining fallow fields, 16 out of 116
interviewed farmers were willing to accept 46,000 NT$;
42, 47,500 NT$; 28, 48,500 NT$; 20, 49,500 NT$; and 10,
50,000 NT$.
Quantifying the benefits of fallow land to AES
Rate of participation on AES
The rate of farmer participation in fallow practices can affect
the value of AES. Using the results from the interviews, we
estimate the value of AES, in thousands of NT$, to be
28,197,068 at 14% participation (a = 0.86), 28,392,327 at
50% participation (a = 0.5), 28,516,249 at 74% participa-
tion (a = 0.26), 28,601,265 at 91% participation (a = 0.09),
and 28,645,385 at 100% participation (a = 0; Fig. 4). In
other words, 100% participation represent a 1.5% increase in
AES (448,317,000 NT$) over 14% participation.
Soil fertility on AES
Based on the results from GA, Fig. 5 shows the changes in
AES values due to declined soil fertility after regular har-
vesting of crops. The AES value, in thousands of NT$,
drops from 28,197,080 to 28,197,056 as the index d
increases from 0.15 to 0.32. Figure 6 depicts the trend line
of decreasing AES values with increasing d.
Figure 7 illustrates the changes in AES values due to
declined soil fertility with abandoned land. The AES value,
in thousands of NT$, decreases from 28,197,064 to
Fig. 4 Simulation results showing the effect of fallow participation
rate on AES
Fig. 5 Simulation results showing the effect of soil fertility after



















Fig. 6 Trend line showing the effect of soil fertility post regular
cropping on AES
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28,066,272 as the index h increases from 0.15 to 0.19.
Figure 8 shows the trend line relating the two variables.
Figure 9 shows the changes in AES values due to restored
soil fertility by fallowing. The AES value, in thousands of
NT$, increases from 28,197,068 to 28,197,078 as the index
r increases from 0.02 to 0.09. The trend line relating the two
variables is depicted in Fig. 10. Figures 9 and 10 therefore
suggest that soil fertility restored by fallowing can increase
the overall production, thus improving the value of AES. On
the other hand, the contribution in this paper is that the value
of ecosystem services can be measured with the profit.
Changes in AES in Figs. 5 and 9 are relatively smaller
in percentage than Fig. 7. This implies that the effect of the
parameter h on AES is more sensitive than the parameters d
and r.
In summary, the results show that provisioning for
fallow land and planting with green manure improves
biocapacity and increases farm profits within a governing
parameter (r) by restoring soil fertility. Fallowing exists
whether benefit from fallowing is significant or not. Based
on the result, this study proposes a hierarchical relationship
to achieve sustainable agricultural land use (Fig. 11).
Moreover, increasing subsidy is the basic component to
improve AES. It can contribute indirectly to the AES
through the farmers’ participation in fallow. Thus, it can be
said that the increased AES is generated from farmers’
participation in fallow to reduce environmental negative
externalities. These results should be of use to future
agricultural policy making, especially with respect to the
advantages afforded by AES. In this case, appropriate farm
policy could have both ecological and economic advanta-
ges. From an ecological viewpoint and for greater farmer
productivity, farmers would benefit from planting more
fallow land with green manure to maintain soil fertility.
Conclusion
This study has examined how PES can improve AES and
the benefits derived from them. In particular, it has
















Fig. 8 Trend line showing the effect of abandoned land on AES
Fig. 9 Simulation results showing the effect of soil fertility restored



















Fig. 10 Trend line showing the increase in AES with soil fertility
restored by fallowing
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examined soil fertility and how the practice of leaving land
fallow can improve crop yields and AES. The results show
that the right incentives can help in maximizing the total
return to society when appropriate agricultural practices are
undertaken. Clearly, it is worth emphasizing that an
incentive subsidy based on PES is an effective mechanism.
However, the pricing of incentives requires an under-
standing of farmer behavior in order to improve partici-
pation in fallowing practices. In this study, this
understanding was achieved through an interview process,
which examined the underlying issues for farmers, such as
changing demographics and a subsidy gap, which exists
between the present subsidy and the cost of maintaining
fallow practices. In areas where crop rotations include a
fallow of one or more years, there are multipurpose uses of
legumes—to regenerate soil fertility, provide high-quality
forage, and reduce the labor costs of initiating the fol-
lowing cultivation cycle (IRRI 1988). We therefore con-
clude that a well-priced incentive aimed at maximizing the
value of ecosystem services can lead to substantial social
benefits due to a more complete understanding of farmer
motivations. At the same time, planting green fertilizer
during fallow periods to restore soil fertility improves the
supply of agriculture ecosystem services. We further con-
clude that fallowing based on farmers’ participation has a
large positive effect on AES and on factors that affect
human social welfare, such as the food and biofuel sup-
plies. In short, appropriate government subsidy not only
reflects the true value of ecosystem services but also
achieves social welfare.
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